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The period after the fall of the Roman Empire is still widely re-
garded as one of untrammelled violence. In some formulations it is 
(to caricature the approach only slightly) thought that the end of 
Roman civilization was followed by a period wherein: 
'the labours and happiness of peaceful development are ... wiped 
out by the upburst of elemental passions which have only slumbered. 
The long tranquillity of the Roman sway ended in the violence and 
darkness of the Middle Age' 2. 
In perhaps more optimistic readings of the situation, this was a 
'heroic age' 3 . Another approach would interpret the post-Roman 
1 This article is based upon my earlier paper 'Violence and society in the 
early medieval west: an introductory survey', in G.HALSALL (ed.), Vio-
lence and Society in the Early Medieval West, Woodbridge, Boydell & 
Brewer, 1998, pp. 1-45. Readers will find there a more extended treatment of 
the problems of early medieval violence, and a much longer bibliography. I 
have taken this opportunity to expand on some points made there and add 
various items to the bibliography. I thank Professor Chris Wickham 
(University of Birmingham) and Dr. Nira Gradowicz-Pancer (University of 
Haifa) for discussing my earlier piece with me. I am also very grateful to 
Professor J. M. Usunáriz and the board of Memoria y Civilización for in-
viting me to contribute this paper. 
2 S. DELL, Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age, London, 
MacMillan, 1926 (repr. London, George Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 306-
307. 
3 The title, famously, of H.M. CHADWICK's classic work: The Heroic 
Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1912. 
[Memoria y Civilización 2,1999, 7-29] 
8 Guy Halsall 
centuries as a part of the 'civilizing process' 4, wherein even and uni-
linear progress was made towards more 'Christianized' social and 
political norms, which eschewed physical violence in favour of other, 
less sinful alternatives5. 
Indicative of many of these approaches are interpretations of the 
'blood-feud'. Following the dissolution of the Western Empire in the 
course of the fifth century, it is alleged that state power was weak and 
that, consequently, people were forced to rely on 'self-help mecha-
nisms' such as 'blood-feud' to maintain the peace within their locali-
ties. In traditional explanations, the threat of 'mutually assured 
destruction' of families through quite legitimate reciprocal killing, 
involving widely defined kin-groups, acted as a brake upon any urge 
to use lethal violence to settle disputes. In interpretations driven by 
readings of the sagas or heroic poems, much is made of characters 
doomed to extract vengeance upon close-friends or marital relatives 
by the demands of 'the' blood-feud6. 
The correlate of this view of law and order upheld by kin-groups 
more or less mechanically bound to the exigencies of the institution 
of feud, is a vision of the impotent early medieval state. In this 
sphere, the power of the 'private' brings with it the weakness of the 
'public'. As J.M. Wallace-Hadrill argued in an important article, the 
kings of the 'Barbarian West' sanctioned 'blood-feud' in their law-
codes as a means of preserving peace in their realms 'faute de 
mieux' 7 . This conception of feud and its concomitant interpretation of 
4 N. ELIAS, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State 
Formation and Civilization, 2 vols, (trans. N. Jephcott), Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1994 (the book was originally published in 1939). 
5 For a recent example of the approach see J.W. BUSCH, 'Vom Attentat 
zu Haft: Die Behandlung von Kunkurrenten und Opponenten der Frühen 
Karolinger', in Historische Zeitschrift, 263, 1996, pp.561-588. I am grateful 
to Professor Mayke De Jong (Universiteit Utrecht) for this reference. 
6 It is interesting to note how often the definite article is used before 
'blood-feud'; the phrase 'the blood-feud' gives this aspect of early medieval 
violence the appearance of an unchanging, monolithic institution. 
7 J.M. WALLACE-HADRILL, "The bloodfeud of the Franks', in J.M. 
WALLACE-HADRILL, The Long-Haired Kings, London, Hutchinson, 
1962, pp.121-147. See also R.V. COLEMAN, 'Domestic peace and public 
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the nature of society and politics, remains very common. In this arti-
cle I will reassess the early medieval feud, in particular by suggesting 
some axes for the analysis of violence in this period. 
The best place to begin is with the definition of 'feud'. The 
following does not seem to be controversial: 
'A state of bitter and lasting mutual hostility; especially such a 
state between two families, tribes or individuals, marked by 
murderous assaults in revenge for some dreadful insult or wrong'8. 
We could equate feud with vendetta; certainly (as with the dic-
tionary definition just quoted) that would be the way in which most 
Anglophone people would comprehend it. As understood in the 
English-speaking world, feud is an ongoing relationship between two 
groups, marked by reciprocal acts of violence, each of which is 
carried out as revenge for the previous act. 
This definition does not seem problematic. The kinds of violent 
relationship implicit in, and perfectly described by, the modern words 
feud or vendetta are well attested in anthropological and historical 
literature, in diverse contexts. Anthropological study of the phenome-
non has contributed numerous insights as we shall see. The historical 
problem arises when we consider early medieval 'feuds'. Etymologi-
cally, the modern English word 'feud', like the modern German 
'Fehde', or the Spanish 'feudo', derives from Germanic words like 
faida,faithu or faehthe, all of which are attested in early medieval 
sources, legal or otherwise. Yet, when we look closely at their con-
text, what seems to be implied by these words is something quite 
different from vendetta, or the modern meaning of 'feud'. They are, 
as Wallace-Hadrill noted, vernacular synonyms for Latin terms like 
inimicitia9 -words which, to be sure, have the sense of hostility or 
order in Anglo-Saxon law', in J.D. WOODS & D.A.E. PELTERET (eds.) 
The Anglo-Saxons. Synthesis and Achievement, Waterloo, Ont., Wilfrid Lau-
rier University Press, 1985, pp.49-61. 
8 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, Oxford U.P, 1986, p.744. 
9 J. M. WALLACE-HADRILL, 'The bloodfeud of the Franks', in op. cit., 
pp.122-123; This is clear from Edictum Rothari (of 643; hereafter Ed.Roth.), 
c.74: Faida quod est inimicitia: F. BEYERLE (ed.), Leges Langobardorum 
10 Guy Halsall 
enmity, but not (without undue semantic stretching) of vendetta or 
feud. 
As we shall see, what usually happens in our early medieval 
sources is that, when one social group, usually a family or kindred but 
occasionally an institution such as a monastery, is wronged, it makes 
a great display of its anger, of the fact that it has been wronged and of 
the fact that it has the right to extract vengeance upon the wrong-
doers. Pressure is thereby brought upon the original attackers to make 
reparation, either informally or through the local officers of the law, 
or sometimes through the mediation of the church. Where compensa-
tion is not paid, the aggrieved party sometimes carries out a retalia-
tory attack. If the correct procedures have been followed, a successful 
vengeance killing is held to be quite legal, and terminates the dispute. 
There is little conception that the recipients of the retaliatory attack 
have any right to feel aggrieved, or that they would be justified in 
responding violently to it. This, surely, is not feud. 
However, the existence of 'the' blood-feud remains firmly in-
grained within modern notions of what the early medieval world was 
like; it is probably not unjustifiably flippant to suggest that this may 
at least partly derive from the alliterative similarity of 'feud' and 
'feudal'. Numerous historians have therefore taken the definition of 
feud and tried to bend it to fit the early medieval situation; none has 
succeeded 1 0. The time has surely come to acknowledge that the types 
of relationship implicit in the modern word 'feud' did not commonly 
exist in the early medieval West". What contemporaries called faida, 
or its cognates, was something else. 
643-866, Witzenhausen, Deutschrechlichter Instituuts-Verlag, 1962. K. 
FISCHER-DREW (trans.), The Lombard Laws, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
University Press, 1973. 
1 0 M. BENNETT, 'Violence in eleventh-century Normandy: feud, warfare 
and polities', in Guy HALSALL (ed.), op. cit., pp.126-140, for discussion of 
these attempts and a bibliography. 
1 1 As acknowledged already by T. REUTER, 'Unruhestiftung, Fehde, Re-
bellion, Widerstand: Gewalt und Frieden in der Politik der Salierzeit', in S. 
WEINFURTER (ed.) Die Salier und das Reich Band 3, Gesellschaftlicher 
und ideengeschichtlicher Wandel im Reich der Salier, Sigmaringen, Thor-
becke, 1991, pp.297-325, at pp.300 and 303. 
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This point may be substantiated by comparing several aspects of 
what I have elsewhere termed early medieval 'customary vengeance' 
with feud1 2. I have argued that we may distinguish between 'tactical' 
and 'strategic' violence' 3. Tactical violence aims directly at the 
resolution of a dispute. A rival for power is either physically inca-
pacitated, killed or driven away; disputed lands or other properties are 
seized by force; wrongs done to a party are avenged by the simple 
expedient of inflicting a like injury in return. The relationship 
between the attacker and the attacked is direct, and the disputant's 
aim is achieved directly by violence against his or her opponents. 
Strategic violence is different. In many instances one party in a 
dispute does not have the power to attempt to achieve its aims by 
open, tactical violence against its opponents, or cannot be sure that 
third parties would regard such violence as legitimate. In such cases, 
'strategic' violence ensues. Here, the party may adopt a publicly 
violent or angry stance, threatening violence. Alternatively, it might 
commit a token or even ritualized act of violence to signify its dis-
pleasure. Another possibility might be an act of violence against a 
third party. In all of these options, the violence aims not at 
terminating the dispute directly, but rather at drawing attention to it. 
Highlighting the existence of the grievance or dispute, is intended to 
bring about attempts by third parties to arbitrate or otherwise end the 
dispute. 
Now, in 'true' feud, each act of violence is strategic. It draws 
attention to the dispute, rather than solving it in itself (unless perhaps 
one side succeeds in completely wiping out the other) 1 4 . The violence 
1 2 Guy HALSALL, 'Violence and society in the early medieval west' in 
op.cit, p.22 ff. I have, throughout this article, used the early medieval word 
faida rather than the modern 'feud' to refer to the early medieval institution. 
Where I refer to historiography, however, I occasionally talk of early medie-
val "feuds" (in inverted commas). 
13 Ibidem, pp. 16-19. I owe the term 'strategic' violence to Chris Wick-
ham. 
1 4 A possible (though far from certain) early medieval instance of this 
occurrence might be the feud in Ravenna described by Agnellus of Ravenna 
where the faction of the Porta Posterulensis wiped out the opposing Porta 
Teguriensis faction. Agnellus, Libellus Pontificalis Ecclesiae Ravennatis, 
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reminds people of the feud and marshals support, thus periodically 
aligning or realigning society behind one or other side. The feud 
serves to create or activate ties of kinship or friendship1 5. This is why 
writers like Black-Michaud 1 6 have seen feud as a structuring principal 
of society. 
In most early medieval vengeance killing, however, the violence is 
tactical, and, provided that it is conducted according to the accepted 
norms, it terminates the dispute. These societies held to a law of 
Talion: an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. In the settlement of 
post-Roman disputes, the strategic element was the threat of violence. 
Public declarations of enmity or anger made clear an intention to seek 
vengeance, publicized the wrong done, and moreover manifested the 
party's belief that it had the right, should it wish to do so, to extract 
vengeance. It is this legal right which was meant by the word faida 
and its cognates. Such declarations of ira or inimicitia, or (by the end 
of the period) defiance (diffidatio) of a lord, were strategic in that 
they were intended to bring about attempts by third parties to 
intercede and end the dispute. There might, as stated, be considerable 
variation through the early medieval period. In some situations such 
strategies aimed to involve royal officers of the law; in other contexts 
the intermediaries might be the church, local monasteries, or other 
members of the local or peer-group community. 
These declarations raise the issue of the legitimacy of violence. In 
'feuding societies', each violent act is legitimized by the previous 
attack and legitimizes the next one. This is where the analogy with 
cc. 126-8, O. HOLDER-EGGER (ed.), Monumenta Germaniae Histórica 
[hereafter MGH] Scriptores Rerum Langobardorum et Italicarum, Hanover, 
Hahn, 1878, pp.278-391. For analysis, see T.S. BROWN, 'Urban violence in 
early medieval Italy: the cases of Rome and Ravenna', in Guy HALSALL 
(ed.) op. cit., pp.76-89, at p.83-86. 
1 5 Cogently demonstrated, in analysis of Merovingian royal 'feuding' 
warfare, by S.D. WHITE, 'Clotild's revenge: Politics, kinship and ideology 
in the Merovingian bloodfeud', in S.K. COHN Jr. & S.A. EPSTEIN (ed.), 
Portraits of Medieval and Renaissance Living. Essays in Memory of David 
Herlihy, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 107-30. 
1 6 J. BLACK-MICHAUD, Feuding Societies Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1975, ch.4. 
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exchange, adopted by writers like Bourdieu and Black-Michaud is 
helpful". Each attack or killing places the other side in a position of 
'debt', until it is repaid by retaliatory violence. The two sides stand in 
a relationship of debtor and creditor until the debt of blood is paid 
off; then the roles and relationships are reversed. Thus, although re-
venge is justified, and revenge killings are held as legitimate, this 
does not end the dispute; it just legitimizes the other side's next attack 
- as they become the aggrieved party. A 'true' feud is thus very 
difficult to terminate, and is almost never ended through violence (as 
stated above). 
On the other hand, if we consider the legitimacy of vengeance in 
an early medieval context, we see something quite different. There is 
absolutely no indication that, if an individual killed or injured another 
and refused to pay compensation to the victim or his relatives, he or 
his family would have any grounds for complaint if the victim's kin 
carried out a vengeance attack upon him. It was, however, necessary 
that the correct procedures be followed. In sixth-century Gaul, 
vengeance could not be exacted until the local count or judge had 
found in favour of the wronged party 1 8. In the famous "feud" of Sichar 
and Chramnesind (585-7) 1 9, Chramnesind forfeited half of the 
1 7 P. BOURDIEU, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1977, pp.10-15; J. BLACK-MICHAUD, op. cit., 
pp.80-85. 
1 8 Gregory of Tours, Uber Vitae Patrum 8.vii. B. KRUSCH & W. 
LEVISON (ed.) MGH Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum 1.2, Hanover, 
Hahn, 1969; E. JAMES (trans.) Gregory of Tours. Life of the Fathers, Liver-
pool, Liverpool University Press, 1991 (2nd edition). 
1 9 Gregory of Tours, Libri Historiarum [hereafter LH], VII.47, IX. 15: B. 
KRUSCH & W. LEVISON (ed.), MGH Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum 
1.1, Hanover, Hahn, 1951; L. THORPE (trans.), Gregory of Tours. History of 
the Franks, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974. For studies of this "feud", see E. 
AUERBACH, Mimesis. The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, 
Princeton, Princeton U.P, 1953, ch.4; J. M. WALLACE-HADRILL, op. cit.; 
E. JAMES, 'Beati Pacifici: Bishops and the law in sixth-century Gaul', in J. 
BOSSY (ed.), Disputes and Settlements. Law and Human Relations in the 
West, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp.25-46; P.H. 
SAWYER, 'The bloodfeud in fact and fiction', in Tradition og Historieskriv-
nung (Acta Jutlandica 63.2 Humanistik série 61), pp.27-38; Guy HALSALL, 
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compensation otherwise due to him for attacking Sichar's household 
contrary to the findings of the tribunal. 
When Chramnesind eventually did kill Sichar, he hung his body 
on the fence-post of his house. This was an important ritual. It was 
vital to proclaim the legitimacy of a vengeance killing by making it 
public. On several occasions in Gregory of Tours' Histories the 
bodies of those killed legitimately are thrown or dragged into the 
street2 0. These are usually killings by royal officers, but near-contem-
porary Frankish law makes a similar point. Anyone found breaking 
into a man's house or courtyard may be killed with impunity, but the 
body must be displayed 2 1. Conversely, the Pactus Legis Salicae of 
c.511 penalized heavily attempts to conceal a killing. Its compilers 
envisaged a treble fine for those who hid a body or threw it down a 
well 2 2. Seventh-century Lombard law, for similar reasons, imposed 
heavier penalties for killings at night 2 3. The reasons for these concerns 
are clear enough. Concealment would indicate that the killer had no 
valid reason for committing the murder; perhaps more importantly, 
within the small-scale rural societies of the period, such killings 
might lead to vengeance being exacted on the wrong people and thus 
to spiralling violence. 
op. cit., pp. 1-2 and p.24 for rejection of the interpretation of these events as 
feud. 
20 e.g., LH VII.29, Vffl.36, IX. 10. 
21 Lex Ribvaria, c.80. F. BEYERLE & R. BUCHNER (ed.), MGH Leges 
I, 3 Lex Ribvaria, Hanover, Hahn, 1951; T.J. RIVERS (trans.), Laws of the 
Salian andRipuarian Franks, New York, A.M.S., 1987. 
22 Pactus Legis Salicae [hereafter PLS] c.41.iv, vi, vii. K.A. ECKHARDT 
(ed.), MGH Leges I, 4.1 Pactus Legis Salicae, Hanover, Hahn, 1962; K. 
FISCHER-DREW (trans.), Laws of the Salian Franks, Philadelphia, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1990. 
23 Ed.Roth. c.32-33. Other indirect or secret attacks were similarly pe-
nalized: Hirings of assassins: PLS c.28; Ed. Roth., c.l 1; witchcraft: PLS c.19, 
64; poison: PLS c.19; Ed. Roth, c.l39-42; lending weapons to another: 
Aethelberht's code (Kentish, c.604) c.18-19; Ed.Roth. c.307; Alfred's code, 
c.19. For Anglo-Saxon Laws, see F. LIEBERMANN (ed.), Die Gesetze der 
Anglesachsen, vol.1, Aalen, Scientia, 1960; D. WHITELOCK (trans.), En-
glish Historical Documents. I c.500-1042, London, Eyre Methuen, 1979 (2nd 
edition). 
Reflections on Early Medieval Violence 15 
Another difference between the early medieval situation and true 
feuding societies, and one not unrelated to the question of legitimacy, 
concerns compensation. In feuding societies, compensation is not 
regarded as an honourable alternative to a repayment of the 'debt' in 
blood. Instead, acceptance of a compensation payment indicates more 
of a 'time out'; the side accepting the payment acknowledges that, for 
the time being at least, it is incapable of extracting violent retribution. 
There is no guarantee that, should the situation change, they will not 
launch an attack to avenge the previous assault; this would be more 
honourable 2 4. In contrast, early medieval data shows that a payment of 
compensation was held to terminate the dispute. Attacks after 
compensation had been paid, or even, as shown by the example of 
Chramnesind cited above, after a court had awarded it but before it 
had been paid, was quite illegitimate. 
Connected to the issue of compensation is that of compurgation-
oath-helping. Again some differences in practice emerge between 
early medieval western European society and the feuding societies 
observed by anthropologists. Like some of the other differences, these 
may partly relate to differences in social and political structure, to 
which we shall return. In feuding societies like the Bedouin, oath-
swearing is an index of whether or not a kin-group is willing to fight 
on behalf of a member. If both sides assemble the requisite number of 
oath-swearers, this produces a stand-off and, presumably, at some 
point an escalation to violence. In contrast, studies of early medieval 
law and society have suggested that compurgation worked in slightly 
different ways, to establish community consensus over a person's 
guilt or innocence. Here, the inability to establish consensus over 
someone's guilt renders force or violence illegitimate. 
Critical in understanding the contrasts between the early medieval 
situation and that of feuding societies reported in anthropological 
work are the differences in social and political organization. Black-
Michaud has argued that feud is a structuring principal of society in 
the absence of effective higher authority2 5. Thus, for the Cyrenaican 
Bedouin or the inhabitants of mountainous regions of Albania, the 
J. BLACK-MICHAUD, op. cit, pp.12, 109-118. 
As above, n.16. 
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feud serves, as noted, periodically to define the outlines of society. 
The same is probably true of the feuds of the border regions between 
England and Scotland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when 
neither kingdom was able to make its power effective in those areas, 
and when they could not, in any case, agree in whose jurisdiction 
certain territories lay. Similar points apply in the Highlands of Scot-
land, and also in 'Saga Iceland'. It has been noted, with reason, that 
feuds can only really take place between groups of more or less equal 
social, political and economic power. 
Do these points apply to the early medieval situation? Was the 
early medieval faida a 'self-help' mechanism legitimized by early 
medieval rulers in the absence of effective state power? First of all, 
we must note that the legitimation of violence was a very frequent 
concern of early medieval rulers. Restricting legitimate violence, and 
armed force, to that which was approved by the state was no easy 
matter in this period. Without an independent coercive force - a 
standing army- early medieval rulers had to rely on local magnates. 
Someone condemned for the abuse of violence at one turn might, at 
the next, be the very person whom a king invested with the authority 
to raise an armed force on his behalf. Therefore a key determinant in 
discussions of legitimate and illegitimate violence was the relation-
ship between the king and the local aristocracy. If the latter were 
dependent upon the former for their local status, then a king's 
attempts to restrict or control violence would be more likely to be 
effective. If the aristocracy was effectively independent of royal 
authority, then a king would have to act with greater circumspection. 
This dynamic led to much diversity and change throughout the early 
medieval period. Most of our evidence on this subject refers to per-
ceptions of royal power rather than its reality, but changes and varia-
tions are nevertheless clear, and there are often snippets of informa-
tion in other sources to clarify the picture. A great deal of this legis-
lation concerns the formation of armed bands 2 6, which makes an in-
teresting topic for study in itself, but another body concerns 
vengeance, and here we approach the question of feud and political 
organization. 
Guy HALSALL, op. cit, pp.8-10, for introduction and references. 
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Early medieval faida is very often seen as a 'Germanic' institu-
tion, introduced into the former western empire by the barbarians 2 7, 
and thus a key area where post-Roman law broke with Roman tradi-
tion. These ideas may have to be modified. Leaving aside the fact that 
true feud is found in many areas of the world, like North Africa and 
the Middle East, where Germanic antecedent can have nothing to do 
with its occurrence, and leaving aside the fact that true feud was 
known, if not legally recognized, within the Roman Empire in more 
geographically inaccessible areas (underlining the point about feud's 
occurrence in the absence of effective higher authority) 2 8, we must 
consider very late imperial legislation. In the fifth century, almost a 
century before the promulgation of the earliest 'barbarian' codes, as 
the political authority of the western emperor^ began to break down 
some, to my mind vital, laws were enacted. In 403 Emperor Honorius 
granted everyone the right of 'public vengeaiice' (publicae ultionis 
indultum) against deserters and latrones39. Ten years later, Honorius 
permitted the right of vengeance (arbitrium ultionis) to loyal African 
landowners harried by the intrusion of army quartering officers30. As 
far as I am aware, the precedent set by thqse laws has not been 
accorded due importance, but it gains further significance by 
consideration of the famous fragment of Zosirnus which deals with 
Honorius' letter to the citizens of Brittia31. Here the emperor, who had 
27 e.g. O. BRUNNER, Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in 
Medieval Austria (trans. H. Kaminsky & J. Van Hdrn Melton), Philadelphia 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, pp. 16 and 25; A. CALLENDAR 
MURRAY, Germanic Kinship Structure: Studies in Law and society in An-
tiquity and the Early Middle Ages, Toronto, Pontifipal Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1983. 
2 8 B. SHAW, 'Bandits in the Roman Empire', ip Past and Present, 105 
1984, pp.4-52, at p.7, n.12. 
2 9 Theodosian Code VII.18.xiv (2 Oct. 403). C. PHARR (trans.) Theodo-
sian Code: The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitu-
tions, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952; T. MOMMSEN, P.M. 
MEYER & P. KRUEGER (ed.) Theodosiani Libri XVI cum Constitutionibus 
Sirmondianis, Zurich, Weidman, 1971. 
30IbidemVU.S.x (413). 
3 1 Zosimus VI.10.ii; R.T. RIDLEY (trans.), Zosirnus. New History 
(Byzantina Australiensia 2), Canberra, Australian Association for Byzantine 
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issued the two laws just mentioned at about the same time, instructed 
the citizens of Brittia to look to their own defence. This, surely, was 
another grant of the right of vengeance. There was, therefore, a late 
Roman precedent for state legitimation of vengeance, and for the 
granting away of the state's monopoly on armed force 3 2. In this way, 
the legitimation of vengeance-killing might be a sign of the 
comparative weakness of the state. 
But both laws of Honorius had defined those against whom 
vengeance was legitimate; the state had still reserved to itself the 
right to decide the legitimacy of vengeance-killing. In this light we 
can consider two pieces of much later legislation specifically con-
cerned with vengeance: clause 32 of Charlemagne's Capitulare 
Missorum Genérale of 802 3 3, and the Anglo-Saxon Code known to 
historians as 'II Edmund' (entitled by Dorothy Whitelock, a little 
misleadingly, 'King Edmund's code concerning the blood-feud') 3 4. 
We can take the second, later, of these examples first. Edmund 
restricted vengeance: it could only be carried out against the killer 
himself; it could not be carried out against any of his kin if these re-
fused to support him; the killer, if he called upon friends and kin to 
support him, had a year to pay the compensation (and regulations 
were set out for the safe payment of the fine); if vengeance was 
carried out contrary to these restrictions, against the killer's kin, then 
the avenger was outlawed and his pursuit and punishment became 
royal business. Note, however, that there was no mention of the kin of 
Studies, 1982. Let us leave aside, for now, the thorny old problem of whether 
Brittia means Britain or Bruttium. 
3 2 Vengeance-killing was also practised by 'Romans' in Merovingian 
Gaul. See, for example, the killing of Gregory of Tours' brother, Peter, in 
Langres, in an avowed act of vengeance (this claim was not accepted, so the 
killer was outlawed), and the killer's own death (in a quite separate affair) at 
the hand of another set of avenging relatives: Gregory, LH V.5. This was not 
blood-feud, contra I.N. WOOD, 'Jural relations amongst the Franks and 
Alamanni', in I.N. WOOD (ed.), Franks and Alamanni in the Merovingian 
Period. An Ethnographic Perspective, Woodbridge, Boydell, 1998, pp.213-
226, atp.215, n.3. 
3 3 A. BORETTUS (ed.), MGH Capitularía Regum Francorum I [hereafter 
Capit. /] Hanover, Hahn, 1883, no.33; P.D. KING (trans.), Charlemagne. 
Translated Sources, Lambrigg, King, 1987, pp.240-241. 
3 4 D. WHITELOCK (trans.), op. cit., no.38. 
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a killer, slain in legitimate vengeance, being permitted to take re-
venge in their turn; illegal vengeance is for the king to punish. Again, 
we see that this is not feud. 
One hundred and forty years previously, Charlemagne had also 
concerned himself with vengeance. Charlemagne's reign saw par-
ticularly determined attempts to define and restrict violence to that 
carried out upon royal (or imperial) orders. Armed bands, especially 
those bound by oath, were heavily penalized; numerous laws, and an 
entire capitulary, dealt with latrones (persistent violent offenders)3 5. 
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that Charlemagne's Ca-
pitulare Missorum Genérale, known to historians as the 
'Programmatic Capitulary', attempted to ban all vengeance. All 
attempts to settle a dispute had to be conducted through the medium 
of Charlemagne's own officers. A murderer must agree to pay com-
pensation, and the victim's relatives must accept it, once it is paid. 
Anyone taking vengeance will be punished. Charlemagne viewed 
vengeance as a sin 3 6. Things may not always have worked in the way 
that Charlemagne intended 'on the ground'; such luminaries of the 
'Carolingian renaissance' as Alcuin and Theodulf involved their 
followers in a less than edifying fracas3 7. Nevertheless, the difference 
between Charlemagne's and Edmund's codes reveals interesting 
variations in the perception of royal power, and it would be 
unnecessarily sceptical to assume that, at least at the core of Charle-
magne's realm, things were never conducted according to the regula-
tions set out in the capitularies. 
Guy HALS ALL, op. cit, pp. 13-15, and references. 
3 6 Taking a literal interpretation of Romans xii.19: Vengeance is mine; I 
will repay, saith the Lord. Charlemagne's 789 capitulary listed revenge 
(ultio) alongside latrocinium (probably armed robbery) and avarice as the 
major causes of homicide. No one should be killed without legal sentence 
having been passed. Capit. 122.1xvii. 
3 7 J.L. NELSON, 'Violence in the Carolingian world and the ritualization 
of ninth-century warfare', in Guy HALSALL (ed.), op. cit, pp. 90-107; 
P.FOURACRE, 'Carolingian justice: the rhetoric of improvement and con-
texts of abuse', La Giustizia nell'Alto Medioevo, Secoli V-VIII (Settimane di 
Studio, 42,1995, pp.771-803. 
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As noted, in sixth-century Gaul, the local count or judge had to 
decide in favour of a plaintiff before vengeance could be taken. 
Gregory of Tours tells us of a miracle which occurred in the context 
of a count's anger at a man who avenged himself without taking the 
matter to court 3 8. We have noted how Chramnesind forfeited half of 
the compensation earlier awarded him when he launched a retaliatory 
attack on Sichar's property in defiance of the court's decision 3 9. It 
seems that in the early medieval period the word latro, which had 
meant 'bandit' and referred to a high level of violent crime during the 
Roman Empire, had its semantic range lowered to mean an habitual 
criminal, and especially one who would not abide by the decision of 
the courts 4 0; hence its equation with fugitivi in Visigothic law 4 1. Thus, 
it becomes clear that the recognition in post-Roman law of the right 
of vengeance was not a sign of royal impotence after all. Royal 
officers had the power to say when vengeance was legitimate, and 
fines had to be paid through them. The 'strategic' declaration that a 
party or family had the right to extract vengeance was usually, at least 
in the earlier part of our period, aimed at bringing in the local count 
or judge 4 2 . This, and the community's acceptance of the royal 
officer's right to legitimize violence, or forbid it, and of his right to 
adjudicate or arbitrate, were actually means of increasing royal con-
trol in the localities. In fact, the way in which, in the immediately 
post-Roman centuries, declarations of inimicitia or faida served to 
call a matter to the attention of a royal officer questions whether we 
should continue to call this a 'self-help mechanism' at all - any more 
than telephoning the police today constitutes a 'self-help mecha-
nism' ! 
Towards the end of the period, when state control waned some-
what, these mechanisms often remained in place, but acted in rather 
different ways. Often, it was a local saint's cult, and the monastery 
Gregory of Tours, Liber Vitae Patrum 8.vii. 
5 9 Gregory, ZJ/VII.47. 
4 0 B. SHAW, op. cit., pp.300-41; Guy HALSALL, op. cit, pp.13-15. 
41 Leges Visigothorum IX.l.xxi: K. ZEUMER (ed.) MGH Leges 1.1 Leges 
Visigothorum, Berlin, Hahn, 1902. 
4 2 As noted by I. N. WOOD, op. cit., pp.214-215. 
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which housed it, which arbitrated4 3. This might bring us closer to the 
workings of the 'true' feud in 'stateless' contexts, but the examples 
cited in discussions of the so-called feuds of even this period still 
differ from those observed in feuding societies. The mechanisms re-
main the same. A wrong is done; a great strategic show is made of 
anger and the right to take vengeance; third parties respond to this 
display, arbitrate and arrange a settlement; the dispute ends. 
Some light may also be shed on the situation by consideration of 
attitudes to the role of God. Previous analyses have assumed that, at 
least in Frankish Gaul, God was regarded as feuding 4 4. Outside treat-
ments of God's feud, or war, with Satan, this seems quite mistaken. 
Divine vengeance (Dei ultio) was, of course, viewed as judgement 
and punishment meted out. If anything, if one can generalise from 
attitudes to divine vengeance, then they support the analysis proposed 
here: that faida was the right to seek redress from the guilty after a 
judgement. After all, can we seriously envisage people as feuding 
with God? The idea that God should feud with mortals surely under-
mines his omnipotence. 
As already mentioned, a true feud can only really involve parties 
of similar power. This is not true in many early medieval situations. 
We can see how an injured party could use its technical, legal right to 
vengeance to make a public display of the wrong done and bring 
about a settlement, through officers of the law. Indeed, instances are 
documented of disputes between parties of quite different socio-po-
litical status resolved in this way, even (and, given the better docu-
mentation available, especially) in the latter part of our period, when 
state power had fragmented. 
Sometimes, admittedly, these disputes were between monasteries 
and powerful lay figures. Nevertheless, the public displays of the 
4 3 See S. WHITE, 'Feuding and Peace-Making in the Touraine around the 
year 1000', in Traditio, 42, 1986, pp. 195-263; G. KOZIOL, 'Monks, feuds 
and the making of peace in eleventh-century Flanders', in T. HEAD & R. 
LANDES (ed.), The Peace of God. Social Violence and Religious Response 
in France around the Year 1000, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992, 
pp.239-258. 
4 4 S. D. WHITE, 'Clotild's revenge', pp.126-128. 
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wrong done and the appeals to the saints to intercede have been very 
well studied in recent years 4 5 and illuminate, albeit in different cir-
cumstances, the general mechanisms discussed above. The rituals 
which were performed are direct analogies with secular declarations 
of inimicitia; this is particularly true of the curses pronounced against 
the enemies of monasteries (like declarations of faida or inimicitia, 
good examples of verbal violence). Appeals to the saint to avenge the 
wrong done its servants find direct comparisons in appeals to secular 
lords to right wrongs done to their followers 4 6. All these rituals are 
strategic, and so is the 'violence' done to third parties: monks would 
ritually humiliate the relics of their saint to make him or her inter-
cede; they would also withhold spiritual services to the remainder of 
the lay community, again to draw attention to their grievance 4 7. Here, 
when the objects of the violence were holy relics or the rest of the 
laity, denied spiritual provision, the relationship between 'aggressor' 
and 'victim' was not the primary social relationship involved in the 
violence; that was the relationship between the monastery and the 
person who had wronged it. The relationships involved in violence 
are another aspect which must be studied. 
Even where the aggrieved party was not a monastery with direct 
access to spiritual or numinous weaponry, analogous mechanisms 
could be employed. Chris Wickham has revealed instances where 
token or symbolic violent acts could be used to call attention to a 
dispute with a more powerful person or party 4 8. Such strategies are 
4 5 P. GEARY, 'Humiliation of Saints', in P. GEARY, Living with the 
Dead in the Middle Ages, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994, pp.95-115; 
P. GEARY, 'Coercion of saints in Medieval Religious Practice', loc. cit. 
pp.116-124; L.K. LITTLE, Benedictine Maledictions. Liturgical Cursing in 
Romanesque France, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993. 
4 6 S.D. WHITE, 'The politics of anger', in B.H. ROSENWEIN (ed.), An-
ger's Past. The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1998, pp.127-152. 
4 7 See above, n.45. 
4 8 C.J. WICKHAM, 'Violence and the settling of disputes in the Tuscan 
countryside in the twelfth century' (unpublished paper). I am grateful to Pro-
fessor Wickham for sending me a copy of this paper. 
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attested in anthropological literature4 9. Oppressed peasants could also, 
of course, make appeal to the saints to intercede 5 0. Lords in dispute 
with persons of lesser status could make use of comparable strategies. 
Open violence against peasants or tenants might not be regarded as 
legitimate or honourable, yet a public display of anger could serve to 
bring about arbitration and resolution by neighbours and friends. Dis-
plays of anger, recently studied in an interesting volume 5 1, may also 
be considered as an aspect of the strategies and rituals of violence. 
The schema set out above thus differentiates between early medie-
val faida and modern notions of feud according to analysis of the 
strategies and mechanisms of violence in dispute settlement, of the 
relationships involved, and of the socio-political context, as well as 
through the related study of attitudes towards the legitimacy of vio-
lence. The most important problem which arises concerns what 
Wallace-Hadrill called 'the dormant feud' 5 2. Here a violent act might 
be avenged or compensated for, but this settlement does not end the 
process. At a later date, either the wrong which was earlier compen-
sated for, or the act of vengeance which responded to it, is remem-
bered and rekindles the hostility between the two parties. Mecha-
nisms, such as song 5 3, exist to keep awareness of the feud alive in the 
minds of the parties involved. In my earlier work I argued that: 
'...if, rather than having a continuous state of violence and enmity 
we have a series of independent incidents taking place to solve imme-
diate problems, and the active and contingent selection from the past 
of particular episodes to justify or explain them, it does not seem ana-
lytically useful to link them into a spuriously continuous 'chain' of 
events and call that feud'5 4. 
E. MARX, 'Some social contexts of personal violence', in 
M.GLUCKMAN (ed.), The allocation of Responsibility, Manchester, Man-
chester University Press, 1972, pp.281-321. 
5 0 L.K. LITTLE, 'Anger in monastic curses', in B. H. ROSENWEIN 
(ed.), op. cit., pp.9-35, atpp.30-31. 
5 1 B. H. ROSENWEIN (ed.), op. cit. 
5 2 J. M. WALLACE-HADRILL, 'The blood-feud of the Franks...'; J. 
BLACK-MICHAUD, op. cit., pp.63-80. 
5 3 J. BLACK-MICHAUD, op. cit., pp.78-79. 
5 4 Guy HALS ALL, op. cit, p.20. 
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I would now modify that view. Clearly, where modern historians 
have joined together the acts of violence, on the basis of a priori 
assumptions about feuding medieval societies, without contemporary 
indications that they constituted such a feud, then I would stand by 
my point. I would also defend it if we could show that a feud had to 
all intents and purposes been forgotten during the interval between 
attacks (though this would be very difficult to demonstrate from our 
evidence). However, the timing of a feuding act might be governed 
by other considerations, the 'immediate problems' mentioned above. 
This does blur the issue and I was perhaps too schematic in drawing a 
hard and fast distinction in such instances. Nevertheless, this shows 
that we do need to look closely at the relationships and disputes in-
volved, thus of whether the violence was tactical or strategic, and of 
attitudes to the legitimacy of the violence before we can fully analyse 
it in terms of feud. 
Each violent act - indeed each social interaction- adds to the 
'memory bank' of society and may be drawn upon contingently,, in 
social practice, to explain later acts. Violence is particularly impor-
tant in forever altering the relationships between people 5 5. It is in-
teresting to note a society wherein appeals to honour and vengeance 
are used to attempt to justify or legitimize violence, but that does not 
in itself make that society a feuding society and it certainly does not 
necessarily make the violence involved a feud. 
However, although such behaviour is well attested in later medie-
val eras, it is not well documented in the early middle ages. Partly 
this is a fault of our evidence, which tends to deal in isolated snap-
shots, but this fault cannot discount the analysis presented here. Even 
the fragmentary evidence which we have does not present us with 
situations where violence was commonly justified by appeals to long-
burning feuds, or indications that particular acts became the cause of 
such long-standing hatreds. It is not easy, either, to find the sorts of 
mechanisms used to keep feuds alive in the minds of participants. 
5 5 B. ROY, Some Trouble with Cows. Making Sense of Social Conflict 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994. 
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The analysis put forward here does, however, allow us to interpret 
some early medieval sequences of violence as feuds. These excep-
tions tend, moreover, to support the anthropological analyses of feud 
mentioned above. One interesting case has been well studied by 
Patrick Geary 5 6. In eleventh-century Provence a long-running dispute 
is recorded between the monks of St-Victor, Marseille, and a group of 
local knights. This was punctuated by acts of violence (none fatal, 
and usually spiritual on the part of the monks), each of which was, in 
our terms, strategic, drawing attention to the dispute and aligning 
local society behind one side or the other. This feud also took place in 
the absence of an effective higher authority between parties of more 
or less equal power. Similarly, the feuds of 'Saga Iceland' also fit the 
schema outlined here, and have been very well studied by William 
Ian Miller and Jesse Byock 5 7. A great deal of endemic early medieval 
warfare can also, helpfully, be seen as structured by the principles of 
feud, and analysed along those lines. In fact, most of the best 
examples of early medieval feud come from warfare between 
kingdoms 5 8. These crucial differences between vengeance (faida) 
within local society, and feud between polities should prevent us from 
eliding the two situations, as has too often been done in the past. 
6 P.GEARY, 'Living with conflicts in stateless France: a typology of 
conflict management systems, 1050-1200', in P. GEARY, op. cit., pp.125-
160. 
5 1 W.I. MILLER, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking. Feud, Law and Society 
in Saga Iceland, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990; J. BYOCK, 
Feud in the Icelandic Saga, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 
Another feud may implied by a diploma of Emperor Henry II (9 March, 
1024): B.H HILL Jr., Medieval Monarchy in Action. The German Empire 
from Henry I to Henry IV, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1972, pp. 190-
192. My thanks to Dr. Paul Kershaw for drawing my attention to this docu-
ment. 
5 8 See, e.g. T. CHARLES-EDWARDS, 'Early Anglo-Saxon kinship re-
visited', in J. HINES (ed.) The Anglo-Saxons from the Migration Period to 
the Eighth Century. An Ethnographic Perspective, Woodbridge, Boydell, 
1998, pp.171-204 (with discussion pp.204-210), at pp.172-177. The exam-
ples cited are between Mercians and Northumbrians in the seventh century, 
and between Geats and Swedes in the heroic poem Beowulf. Violence at a 
similarly high level, also operating on the lines of feud can be seen at 
Gregory, LHVU.2. See also the 'feuds' discussed in S. D. WHITE, 'Clotild's 
revenge...' 
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Warfare could, superficially at least, operate on the principles of 
faida, with compensation being paid to prevent further violence 
(which is hardly surprising), but, unlike lower levels of violence, such 
payments did not necessarily permanently end the dispute, which 
might be revived, and the violence could (and did) persist over 
several stages where each attack was legitimized as revenge for the 
last. 
Even though certain mechanisms remained roughly the same, it 
should be clear that a number of variables made the operation of faida 
more than the mechanical execution of an institution. The rela-
tionships between kings and their aristocracies changed and, as noted, 
this brought with it variations in the power of the state in the locali-
ties. The parties appealed to in order to end disputes could also 
change through place and time 5 9. It is, in any case, mistaken to view 
the early middle ages through the medium of supposedly monolithic 
legal or social institutions; they can only be comprehended through 
an understanding of social practice. Early medieval customary 
vengeance, like feud, contains within it a number of opportunities for 
playing with, as well as within, the rules 6 0. As is clear from Stephen 
White's study of violence in the Touraine around 1000 6 1, aggrieved 
parties delayed or rejected compromise for quite lengthy periods. 
This was a useful social strategy, as it allowed them to make the most 
of their opponent's contrition, and capitalize upon the community's 
awareness that they had suffered a wrong and had the right to avenge 
it. Nonetheless, it seems likely that prolonging this stance too long in 
the face of one's rivals' attempts to make amends could turn opinion 
against the aggrieved party, and portray them as unreasonable and 
intransigent. 
Thus far, I have proposed means of understanding early medieval 
vengeance and differentiating it from feud. The latter term has be-
In what P. GEARY has called 'alternative understandings of legiti-
macy': 'Moral obligations and peer pressure. Conflict resolution in the me-
dieval aristocracy', in C. DUHAMEL-AMADO & G. LOBRICHON (ed.), 
Georges Duby. L'Écriture de l'Histoire, Brussels, De Boeck-Wesmael, 1996, 
pp.217-222, atp.219. 
6 0 P. BOURDBEU, op. cit., pp.6-7. 
6 1 S. WHITE, op. cit. 
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come too value-laden in modern English to be usefully applied to 
early medieval vengeance 6 2. Nevertheless, feud can be used to 
describe other violent relationships, some of which did exist in the 
early middle ages. Of course, if mechanisms failed, then faida could 
become feud, but this does not seem to have occurred often, because 
of the existence of numerous mediating factors: state, church, com-
munity. 
The axes of analysis proposed so far, may also be used to un-
derstand other forms of violence hitherto obfuscated by use of the 
word feud. If we consider closely the relationships involved in vio-
lence, and the aims of this, we can see that a number of high-level 
"feuds" are, similarly, nothing of the sort, and better understand them 
by cutting them free of the entanglements in which modern implica-
tions of the word feud have enmeshed them. Here we are discussing 
the violent competition for power between aristocrats or aristocratic 
factions, such as may be found in Francia in the seventh century 6 3 or 
in eleventh-century Normandy 6 4 and other regions of France, or in the 
German Reich under the Salians 6 5. Most examples are discrete inci-
dents of tactical violence aimed directly at the resolution of a dispute 
or rivalry; the time-span involved, like that in faida but unlike that in 
feud, is limited. The outcomes - victory, defeat or an agreed com-
promise- end that phase of violence. Again, this allows us to reinter-
pret numerous causes celebres of early medieval violence, without 
encumbering ourselves with the word feud. Contemporaries, if they 
wanted a word to describe this sort of thing, called it bellum or, later, 
It would seem that, at some point, the word faida and its Germanic cog-
nates, which was a right or responsibility (as has long been known: J. 
GOEBEL, Felony and Misdemeanour. A Study in the History of Criminal 
Law, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976) has been ex-
tended in meaning to imply ongoing relationships based upon this right or 
responsibility. 
6 3 On which see P. FOURACRE, 'Attitudes towards violence in seventh-
and eighth-century Francia', in Guy HALS ALL (ed.), op. cit., pp.60-75. 
6 4 M. BENNETT, op. cit., represents the most subtle and convincing in-
terpretation of the violence of the so-called anarchy of William the Bastard's 
minority. 
6 5 T. REUTER, 'Unruhestiftung...' 
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werra . It might be simplest for us to follow their usage, and refer to 
internal or external warfare, or perhaps as open armed conflict for 
political power 6 7. 
This article has proposed that early medieval violence be 
approached by considering its aims (strategic or tactical), the attitudes 
to its legitimacy, and the relationships involved. Study of these 
aspects brings with it an awareness of the importance of ritual in early 
medieval violence 6 8. As we have seen above, violence should be 
viewed through the relationships it engenders. These relationships can 
be usefully be seen in terms of a discourse, in particular as the social 
actors' knowledge of the correct responses would be determined by 
their, and their society's, attitudes to the legitimacy of violence. 
These discourses, in turn, are best seen as conducted through the lan-
guage of ritual - so important in so many other areas of early medie-
val life. This underlines that, as we have also seen, these relationships 
involved knowledgeable social actors who actively attempted to 
achieve their own aims through their understandings and manipula-
tions of the rules or norms; they did not act according to the un-
changing exigencies of monolithic institutions. Thus we should 
approach early medieval violence informed by an understanding of 
social practice and the dynamic nature of social structure which that 
implies 6 9. 
These approaches demand, clearly, a nuanced and closely con-
textual approach to the source material of the period 7 0. Not only will 
this reveal the changes in social and political structures, and in atti-
tudes, within the early medieval period; it also enables us to side-step 
fruitless comparisons of levels of violence within the early medieval 
Sometimes werra was distinguished, as internal warfare, from external 
warfare, or helium: J. L. NELSON, op. cit., p.93. 
6 7 Guy HALSALL, op. cit, p.29. 
6 8 One must also consider the importance of ritual violence in the middle 
ages. See, e.g. B.H. ROSENWEIN, 'Feudal war and monastic peace: Cluniac 
liturgy as ritual aggression', Viator, 2 ,1971, pp. 129-157. 
6 9 Thus, as well as by Bourdieu, I am influenced by A. GIDDENS' theory 
of structuration: Social Theory and Modern Sociology, Cambridge, Polity, 
1987. 
7 0 Guy HALSALL, op. cit, pp.6-7. 
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world: Pax Romana versus Merovingian violence; late Merovingian 
anarchy versus Carolingian 'law and order' 7 1; the supposedly in-
creased violence of the Vikings 7 2; the alleged upsurge of violence 
around 1000 7 3. It is clear that the early middle ages were violent, but 
whether more or less violent than preceding or succeeding ages is less 
easy to establish and probably a rather pointless exercise anyway 
(especially when, as here, one eschews the notion of a monolithic 
early middle ages). An awareness of some of the aspects and 
approaches proposed here might lead to a clearer appreciation of the 
fact that the superficially apparent 'violence' of the period was not 
the mindless macho thuggery which is still so often thought to 
characterize the period. In particular, by ridding ourselves of the 
straightjacket imposed by modern assumptions about feud in this pe-
riod, we also free early medieval people from them. After all, they do 
not, outside the imaginations of epic poets 7 4, ever seem to have felt 
bound by the demands of such institutions. Early medieval people 
were more active and more interesting than that. 
7 1 On which, see P. FOURACRE, 'Attitudes towards violence...' 
7 2 Guy HALSALL, 'Playing by whose rules? Another look at Viking 
atrocity in the ninth century', in Medieval History, 2.2, 1992, pp.2-12. 
7 3 This debate has blossomed most recently in the journal Past and Pre-
sent: T.N. BISSON, "The feudal revolution', in Past and Present, 142, 1994, 
pp.6-42; D. BARTHELEMY, 'Debate: The Feudal Revolution. I.' in Past 
and Present, 152, Aug., 1996, pp.196-205; S.D. WHITE, 'Debate: The Feu-
dal Revolution. II.' in Past and Present, 152, Aug., 1996, pp.205-223; T. 
REUTER, 'Debate: The Feudal Revolution. III.' Past and Present, 155, May 
1997, pp.177-195; C.J. WICKHAM, 'Debate: The Feudal Revolution. TVY in 
Past and Present 155, May 1997, pp.196-208; T.N. BISSON, 'Debate: The 
Feudal Revolution. Reply.' in Past and Present, 155, May, 1997, pp.208-
225. 
7 4 P. H. SAWYER, P.H., op. cit., p.36. 
